Criminal Liability for Antimonopoly Law Violations in Russia

 

February 7, 2022

BRACE Law Firm ©

 

Under criminal law, specifically Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (the "CC RF"), there is a single criminal offense involving violations of competition protection laws. Other offenses that may occur during violations of criminal and competition protection laws—primarily Federal Law No. 135-FZ dated July 26, 2006, On Protection of Competition (the "Law on Protection of Competition" or "Law No. 135-FZ") — may fall under related offenses, which this article also addresses.

The legal community notes that when determining the necessity of criminalizing certain acts, the legislature generally follows a set of criteria: the behavior contradicts laws upheld by the social majority, is condemned by most citizens, contradicts moral norms, and causes actual significant harm to core legally protected social values. [1] Such behavior is not so widespread as to be considered the norm for the social majority. Furthermore, another criterion is that the costs required to implement liability measures for behavior that causes or threatens material harm must be comparable to the extent of such harm, while other measures (moral, administrative, etc.) prove ineffective. Additionally, the state must possess sufficient resources to ensure the prevention, detection, recording, and implementation of criminal liability measures (including criminal punishment) that correspond to the nature and degree of public danger of the behavior being criminalized.

In analyzing current violations within the sphere of competitive legal relations, it should be noted that criminal prosecution in Russia does not presently cover all violations of antimonopoly laws. [2]

At the same time, according to the Legal Information Agency, no sentences were issued under Article 178 of the CC RF in 2019, while three sentences were issued in 2020. [3]

The State Duma of the Russian Federation is currently considering a bill to amend Article 178 of the CC RF. The explanatory note to the project states: "The lack of established practice for criminal prosecution under Article 178 of the CC RF is due, in part, to the flawed wording of the elements of the crime in Part 1 of Article 178 of the CC RF, which is incorrect from the standpoint of antimonopoly law. The concept and attributes of a cartel, as well as an exhaustive list of consequences, are established by Part 1, Article 11 of the Law on Protection of Competition and do not include the attribute of restricting competition; meanwhile, other anti-competitive agreements that require proof of competition restriction are currently not criminalized. Therefore, it is necessary to remove the mention of competition restriction from Article 178 of the CC RF as it does not correspond to antimonopoly law. Furthermore, the qualifying attribute of committing the crime by a person using their official position is redundant. First, a person who does not hold an official position cannot enter into a cartel. Second, both 'rank-and-file employees' and executives can actively participate in concluding an agreement. Consequently, it is proposed to introduce a qualifying attribute to Article 178 of the CC RF for committing the crime by a person performing the functions of a sole executive body, a member of the board of directors, or another collegial executive body in a commercial or other organization, as well as a person controlling more than 50% of the total votes represented by voting shares (interests) in the authorized (share) capital of a business entity (partnership, business partnership)." [4]

Thus, this bill suggests a trend toward a broader application of Article 178 of the CC RF.

The Offense of Restriction of Competition

Offenses provided for by Part 1, Article 178 of the CC RF are classified as minor offenses (Part 2, Article 15 of the CC RF). Aggravated offenses provided for in Parts 2 and 3 of Article 178 of the CC RF are classified as serious crimes.

Part 1 of Article 178 of the CC RF describes the basic elements of the crime, Part 2 describes the aggravated elements, and Part 3 describes the especially aggravated elements.

Amendments introduced by Federal Law No. 45-FZ dated March 8, 2015, On Amending Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, clarified the objective side of this crime. It was established that a person who commits an offense under Article 178 of the CC RF shall be released from criminal liability if they are the first among the accomplices to voluntarily report the crime and actively assist in its investigation. Additionally, the thresholds for large-scale and extra-large-scale income and damage — the presence of which triggers criminal liability under this article — were increased tenfold. These changes effectively decriminalized antimonopoly violations that do not meet the specified damage thresholds.

Given the specifics of the offense, several stages occur before a criminal case is initiated under Article 178 of the CC RF:

• Antimonopoly authorities receive information regarding a violation of competition law that has criminal potential.
• Upon initiating a case for violation of antimonopoly law, the antimonopoly authority submits requests to internal affairs agencies to conduct operational-investigative activities. Decisions on antimonopoly law violations that show signs of malfeasance are immediately sent to investigative authorities.
• Once a decision on the antimonopoly violation is received, it is submitted to investigative authorities as a report of a committed crime to determine whether to initiate a criminal case.
• Following the conclusion of investigative actions, a decision is made to either initiate or refuse to initiate a criminal case.

It is important to note the trend that the number of criminal cases initiated based on previous FAS Russia audits has increased in recent years. For example, a high-profile case involved the owner of a pharmaceutical company in the Samara Region, who was found guilty of creating a cartel while participating in auctions for the maintenance of medical equipment totaling over 700 million rubles. [5]

Furthermore, Government Decree No. 1314-r dated June 17, 2019, developed a Program to implement the instructions of the President of Russia on priority measures to detect and suppress cartel activities. Under this Program, law enforcement will no longer need to prove damage from competition restriction in every case; establishing the existence of income from participation in a cartel will suffice. [6] These measures are driven by the fact that the annual damage from such agreements on commodity markets and in tenders is estimated by various experts at 1.5–2% of the Gross Domestic Product. [7]

Criminal Law Aspect of Restriction of Competition

The primary object of offenses under Article 178 of the CC RF is public relations in the sphere of competition and its security, as well as relations in the sphere of activity following the prescribed rules for conducting business in a competitive environment.

The social value of competition is largely determined by Article 8 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which classifies state-guaranteed support for competition as one of the fundamentals of the constitutional order.[8]

FAS Russia identifies the following objects of this crime:

• Generic object: Public relations formed within the economic sphere.
• Specific object: Public relations in the sphere of economic activity.
• Primary immediate object: Public relations formed in the procedure for conducting competition as a constitutional value, as regulated by antimonopoly law.
• Additional object: The property interests of citizens and organizations, as well as legally protected property interests of the state, legitimate interests in receiving income from economic activity, and legitimate interests of consumers regarding the satisfaction of needs for goods at the lowest cost.
• Alternative object: Interests of service; property rights and the security of property rights; freedom, physical integrity, or health, as well as their security.

The objective side of the crime of restricting competition includes:

• The conclusion of a competition-restricting agreement (cartel) by competing economic entities;
• Restriction of competition (the consequence);
• Causing large-scale damage to citizens, organizations, or the state, or the extraction of large-scale income (the second consequence);
• A causal link between the committed actions and the resulting consequences.

The following may be recognized as victims of competition restriction:

• A legal entity whose property and (or) business reputation has suffered large-scale or extra-large-scale damage;
• A physical person who has suffered large-scale or extra-large-scale property damage, or property damage in a corresponding amount along with physical harm to health (in cases involving violence) or moral harm (in cases involving threats of violence).

Under Articles 19–21 of the CC RF, the subject of this offense may be a sane physical person who has reached the age of 16 at the time of the criminal acts. Given the construction of this criminal law norm, the restriction of competition is a crime with a special subject. The subjects of competition restriction should be recognized not only as the relevant persons authorized to act on behalf of a legal entity but also as officials.

The subjective side of this crime is expressed through guilt. Guilt may be characterized by either direct or indirect intent. However, motives and goals do not affect the qualification of the act under Article 178 of the CC RF. In other words, a crime under Article 178 of the CC RF cannot be committed through negligence. This significantly expands the possibilities for prosecuting cartel participants, and in practice, releasing a subject from liability due to a lack of guilt is impossible once their involvement in creating or participating in a cartel is identified.

What Constitutes Restriction of Competition in the Form of a Cartel?

Under Article 11 of the Law on Protection of Competition, a cartel is an agreement between competing Economic Entities — that is, between Economic Entities selling goods in the same commodity market or between Economic Entities purchasing goods in the same commodity market — if such agreements lead or may lead to:

1. The fixing or maintenance of prices (tariffs), discounts, markups (surcharges), and (or) margins;
2. The increase, decrease, or maintenance of prices in tenders;
3. The division of the commodity market by territory, volume of sales or purchases, assortment of goods, or the composition of sellers or buyers (customers);
4. The reduction or termination of the production of goods;
5. Refusal to enter into contracts with specific sellers or buyers (customers).

These consequences are alternative, meaning that proving one of these consequences is sufficient to establish the elements of the crime.

Proving such consequences must be done by obtaining an expert opinion from the antimonopoly authority following the procedure established by the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation (Article 80 of the CPC RF). [9]

When establishing the existence of a cartel agreement, the fact that the cartel participants are competitors in the commodity market and that their arrangements cover the subjects named above must be proven. The existence of competitive relations between cartel participants is confirmed by the results of a competition analysis in the commodity market.

Competing Economic Entities are prohibited from:

• Determining the level of prices offered on the market as a result of arrangements aimed at maintaining unjustifiably high consumer prices;
• Unjustifiably undercutting prices to eliminate other competing Economic Entities from the market and (or) creating barriers to the entry of new competitors;
• Committing other actions aimed at extracting benefit from the cartel. [10]

Cartels (agreements between Economic Entities) that lead or may lead to the increase, decrease, or maintenance of prices in tenders are prohibited. In such cases, it is necessary to establish a causal link between the actions of the bidders and the price changes. Specifically, it must be determined whether the price level reached is typical for such tenders, whether the behavior of several bidders shows signs of a unified strategy, and whether applying this strategy could yield benefits for the cartel participants.

Thus, the general criterion for identifying signs of a cartel in concluded agreements is the occurrence or potential occurrence of negative consequences: the increase, decrease, or maintenance of prices in tenders.

FAS Russia clarifications state that the subject of proof in cases involving cartels in tenders consists of the following elements:

• The existence of an oral or written agreement;
• The subject of the agreement — the tenders for which the agreement was concluded;
• The composition of the agreement participants and the existence of competitive relations between them;
• The possibility of the occurrence or the actual occurrence of the consequences specified in Item 2, Part 1, Article 11 of the Law on Protection of Competition;
• The causal link between the agreement of the bidders and the actual (potential) consequences in the form of price changes in the tenders. [11]

When considering the occurrence or potential occurrence of negative consequences in the form of price changes and the causal link between the agreement and such consequences, the specifics of concluding contracts (acquiring rights and obligations) during tenders must also be considered.

An mandatory alternative consequence of the offense is one or both of the consequences specified in Part 1, Article 178 of the CC RF:

• Income exceeding 50 million rubles;
• Damage exceeding 10 million rubles, regardless of whether it was caused to a citizen, society, or the state.

Under the current version of Article 178 of the CC RF, the restriction of competition is a completed crime at the moment large-scale damage is caused or large-scale income is extracted.

• For example, in a specific case, the court indicated the following set of signs evidencing a cartel agreement:
• The implemented behavioral strategy to maintain prices in auctions (refusal to compete for the auction subject, refusal to submit a price proposal);
• The use of a unified (computer) infrastructure and a single IP address by auction participants when preparing and submitting applications;
• The existence of identical accreditation data — contact phone number, registration address;
• Signs of dependency between participants (conclusion of a trust management agreement, kinship);
• Financial relations between the auction participants. [12]

Who Bears Criminal Liability for Antimonopoly Law Violations?

The subject of the crime regarding the basic offense is a sane physical person (Article 21 of the CC RF) who has reached the age of 16 at the time of the criminal acts, regardless of citizenship, and holds a status corresponding to their role in the crime.

The perpetrator (co-perpetrator) of this offense is:

• A physical person endowed with managerial functions (functions of an official);
• A person with the authority to conclude corresponding agreements (contracts) on behalf of an Economic Entity by virtue of their official position (General Director) or by special authorization (another official endowed with relevant powers);
• A physical person who is not the head of an Economic Entity and is not registered as an individual entrepreneur (tender participant).

Commitments by a perpetrator (co-perpetrator) of competition restriction always fall under Part 2 of the article due to the use of an official position.

Based on Article 178 of the CC RF, the perpetrator (co-perpetrator) may be a physical person endowed with managerial functions or the functions of an official of an Economic Entity who possesses the necessary authority to conclude the relevant contracts and agreements.

When investigating crimes under Article 178 of the CC RF, the managerial functions of the person being prosecuted must be investigated and proven.

Specifically, in one case, the court stated in its sentence that the defendants, while exercising their powers, performed organizational, managerial, and administrative functions, namely: they managed all activities of the company; managed and disposed of funds in the organization's cash desk and bank accounts; and monitored the movement and accounting of these funds. It was established that their powers included the duty to participate on electronic platforms in tenders for the supply of pharmaceutical products for state and municipal needs. [13]

When determining the circle of persons subject to liability, courts in guilty verdicts must:

• Specify the use of the defendants' official position;
• Distinguish the role of each defendant in the commission of the crime;
• Assign punishment in accordance with the role of each participant.

In one particular case involving three suspects, the court established circumstances based on each suspect's role that influenced the sentencing of each convicted individual.[14]

The following must be proven within the criminal process:

• Use of official position — the convicted individuals were the sole executive bodies of the organizations that entered the cartel agreement.
• Intent for the consequences — awareness of the public danger of their actions, anticipating the inevitability of public danger in the form of unlawful competition restriction.
• Existence of a conspiracy with other convicted individuals to commit criminal acts aimed at restricting competition in the supply of goods for medical institutions by concluding a competition-restricting agreement (cartel) between competing Economic Entities.
• The fact of developing a crime plan and implementing the cartel agreement by contacting representatives of state customers (medical institution employees) to ascertain their needs and procurement plans for pharmaceutical and medical goods; price formation and preparation of commercial proposals containing "blocking positions" coordinated with customers to restrict competition and prevent other organizations from participating in the tenders; delivery of these proposals to medical institution employees; and the bribery of medical institution employees to ensure victory in auctions for state contracts.
• The creation of a system for bribing medical institution employees who, for monetary compensation (bribes), assisted in concluding contracts to ensure the organizations' victory in electronic auctions by unlawfully informing the organizations' employees in advance about planned procurements and auctions, providing lists of required goods, based on which the defendants drafted technical specifications for the planned purchases, including specific medical goods with technical characteristics that only the defendants' companies could supply.

Considering the active role of each convicted individual, the duration of their involvement in the criminal scheme, and the existence of mitigating circumstances, two individuals were sentenced to actual imprisonment, with the court stipulating that the sentence be suspended; one individual was fined. [15]

Consequences of Competition Restriction: Damage and Income

To prosecute for criminal liability, consequences in the form of causing large-scale damage to citizens or extracting large-scale income must be established. Large-scale income is defined as income exceeding 50 million rubles, while extra-large-scale income is income exceeding 250 million rubles. Large-scale damage is defined as damage exceeding 10 million rubles, and extra-large-scale damage exceeds 30 million rubles.

The legislature has not defined the concept of damage as it applies to Article 178 of the CC RF. According to some specialists, the interpretations of damage that the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has provided for other offenses are debatable due to the requirements of Part 2, Article 3 of the CC RF.[16]

Antimonopoly authorities indicate that when defining "income" as an alternative consequence to damage, the position of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation set out in the Decree of the Plenum No. 23 dated November 18, 2004, On Judicial Practice in Cases of Illegal Entrepreneurship (the "Decree No. 23") may be used.[17]

Under Item 12 of Decree No. 23, "income" should be understood as "revenue from the sale of goods (works, services) during the period of illegal entrepreneurial activity without deducting the expenses incurred by the person in connection with such activity."

When calculating the amount of income received by an organized group, the total income extracted by all its participants should be used. This position is also set out in Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 48 dated November 15, 2016.[18]

For the purposes of monetary restitution, income is recognized as the total amount of illegal enrichment obtained from the crime (without deducting expenses incurred) in monetary form (cash, non-cash, and electronic funds in rubles and (or) foreign currency) and (or) in kind (movable and immovable property, property rights, documentary and non-documentary securities, etc.).

When determining damage, theoretically any method may be used if it is justified and reasonable, with the priority of the method dictated by the circumstances of the specific case and the quantity and nature of available data. Given that criminal cases involving signs of competition restriction currently require special approaches to establishing damage and its connection to the cartel agreement, forensic economic examinations (e.g., forensic accounting or financial analysis) may be commissioned. [19]

One problem in qualifying an offense under Article 178 of the CC RF is that the term "damage" is an evaluative concept and will be determined by law enforcement specifically in each situation.

It is worth noting that in a specific case, a higher instance, while remanding the case for retrial, indicated the need to investigate arguments that, when determining the qualifying attribute of "extracting extra-large-scale income" during the performance of a state contract, expenses related to the contract's performance should not be considered. [20]

Aggravated Offenses

Parts 2 and 3 of Article 178 of the CC RF provide for aggravated offenses regarding competition restriction.

Under Part 2, these are acts:

a) committed by a person using their official position.

According to Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 32 dated July 7, 2015, the use of an official position is defined as actions by officials, employees, and persons performing managerial functions in commercial and other organizations. [21]

The note to Article 201 of the CC RF specifies which persons are recognized as performing managerial functions: those performing the functions of a sole executive body, a member of the board of directors, or another collegial executive body, as well as persons performing organizational, managerial, or administrative functions in these organizations permanently, temporarily, or by special authorization.

Even as rank-and-file employees, some individuals within the service hierarchy often have the ability to provide assistance, influence, or make decisions within their official powers that can lead to competition restriction.

b) associated with the destruction or damage of another's property or the threat of its destruction or damage, in the absence of signs of extortion;

When qualifying competition restriction under Item "b," Part 2, Article 178 of the CC RF, law enforcement must consider that criminal liability arises only in the absence of signs of extortion.

Destruction of property is traditionally understood as rendering it completely useless, where the destroyed property cannot be restored or used for its intended purpose. Damage is understood as harm to an item that significantly reduces its consumer value. Damage to property assumes the possibility of using it in its damaged state and (or) the possibility of restoring it to its previous state.

A threat is recognized as a dangerous intention of the subject to intimidate or promise to carry out the aforementioned actions to destroy or damage property, expressed in any way: verbally, in writing, through gestures, or through actions. The victim's perception of the threat as real is established in each case based on the specific circumstances, considering both subjective perception and objectivity (method of expression, intensity, nature, the situation, the defendant's personality, etc.).

Unlike extortion, the act in question is not related to a demand for the gratuitous transfer of property or property rights or the performance of actions of a property nature that would violate property relations.

c) causing extra-large-scale damage or resulting in the extraction of extra-large-scale income. Acts committed with the use of violence or the threat of its use are qualified under Part 3, Article 178 of the CC RF. Violence not dangerous to life and health is traditionally understood to include battery or other violent acts associated with physical pain or the restriction of the victim's freedom (tying hands, using handcuffs, locking in a room, etc.). [22]

Criminal Punishment for Restriction of Competition

Types of punishment for committing an offense under Article 178 of the CC RF:

• A fine ranging from 300,000 to 500,000 rubles or in the amount of the convict's salary or other income for a period of one to two years;
• Compulsory labor for a term up to three years, with or without the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term up to one year;
• Imprisonment for a term up to three years, with or without the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to one year.

When determining punishment for aggravated offenses, the term of compulsory labor may be increased to five years, and imprisonment up to six years (under Part 3, Article 178 of the CC RF — up to seven years) with the fine increased up to one million rubles.

Related Offenses in Antimonopoly Law Violations

The commission of a "standalone" offense under Article 178 of the CC RF is extremely rare. Crimes "accompanying" competition restriction include those under Articles 159 (Fraud), 204 (Commercial Bribery), 285 (Abuse of Official Power), 285.1 (Misuse of Budgetary Funds), 286 (Exceeding Official Power), 290 (Receiving a Bribe), 291 (Giving a Bribe), 201.1 (Abuse of Authority in the Performance of a State Defense Order), 204.1 (Abuse in the Procurement of Goods, Works, and Services for State or Municipal Needs), and Article 200.5 of the CC RF (Bribery of a Contract Service Employee, Contract Manager, or Procurement Commission Member).

The practice of antimonopoly investigations into cartels shows that in most cases, cartels possess all the attributes of organized criminal communities, which may lead to the application of Article 210 of the CC RF (Organization of a Criminal Community (Criminal Organization) or Participation Therein). [23]

Related offenses are defined as those sharing a sufficient number of subjective and objective attributes, such as protected public relations, the consequences for such relations, and the crimes committed.

When detecting related offenses, the primary task is the correct qualification of the crimes and the detection and documentation of other types of crimes typically associated with such violations. Some researchers see a problem in the investigation of these crimes due to the lack of a comprehensive approach to criminal prosecution for cartels. Authors emphasize that this problem stems from limited investigative staff and issues regarding differing jurisdictions in cartel investigations. [24]

Most cases initiated under Article 178 of the CC RF generally include additional qualification under other articles, such as Article 159 of the CC RF.

In one specific case, a defendant was prosecuted under Articles 178 and 159 of the CC RF.[25] Under Article 159 of the CC RF, the defendant was charged with intent to unlawfully improve their material status, resulting in a criminal intent driven by self-interest to steal another's property — specifically, funds belonging to an organization—by deception during a construction contract. The defendant chose to steal the funds by deception using documents containing deliberately false information regarding the cost of completed works and by inflating the cost of steel pipes and other materials not provided for in the design and estimate documentation. The defendant intended to use materials that did not meet contract and design requirements and were significantly cheaper than those in the estimate, concealing the actual circumstances from the organization's management by preparing fictitious documents on work completion and material use.

Furthermore, to ensure victory in the procurement procedure and secure the contract under the aforementioned conditions, this individual entered into a criminal conspiracy with another organization to participate in the tenders such that the defendant's company would win. To this end, these individuals entered into an oral agreement:

1. To maintain a minimum price reduction or a minimum contract price reduction in auctions by reducing it by no more than a percentage agreed upon by the parties, creating a pretense of bidding and competition;
2. To jointly determine the outcome of the auction, deciding that the defendant's company would win Auction 1 and the accomplice's company would win Auction 2, thereby creating a cartel.

The court sentenced the defendant to actual imprisonment.[26]

Release from Liability for Restriction of Competition

Under Note 3 to Article 178 of the CC RF, a person who commits the criminal restriction of competition shall be released from criminal liability if they are the first among the accomplices to voluntarily report the crime, actively assist in its detection and (or) investigation, compensate for the damage caused, or otherwise remedy the harm caused, provided their actions do not contain another offense.

Despite this, FAS Russia does not independently evaluate whether the grounds for release from criminal liability have been met and instead refers the case materials to law enforcement agencies. [27]

According to A.P. Tenishev, the main problems with criminal liability under Article 178 of the CC RF are linked to legislative imperfections. In his view, the leniency program — a primary method for detecting cartels where participants who confess are released from liability — does not work in Russia. He notes a significant difference from administrative liability, where it is sufficient to confess and provide evidence of participation in the cartel.

The conditions for release from criminal liability are entirely different. In this case, the suspect must come forward first, cooperate with the investigation, and compensate for all damage caused by the crime. As A.P. Tenishev emphasizes, "damage must be compensated not just for oneself as a physical person, but for all companies that participated in the cartel. This could involve hundreds of millions or billions of rubles."

The second problem is that in a large company where several people participated in the cartel, a confession by one will result in criminal liability for the others.

A.P. Tenishev highlights a third interesting problem: the flawed construction of the Article 178 CC RF norm. The elements are phrased poorly: "restriction of competition by concluding a competition-restricting agreement...". Besides the tautology, this wording creates questions regarding the subject of proof. Under antimonopoly law, a cartel is prohibited per se. It is presumed that any cartel restricts competition. This phrasing leads to questions of whether the restriction of competition must be proven separately or not.[28]

Based on the examples reviewed, it can be concluded that FAS Russia audits often serve as the basis for initiating criminal cases regarding competition restriction. Prosecution for the creation of cartels has become quite common recently. While not all legislative issues in criminal prosecution have been resolved, active legislative activity should provide the necessary additions and clarifications to improve the practice of applying legal norms regulating criminal liability for competition restriction.

____________________________

References

[1] Maksimov, S. V., Utarov, K. A. Criminal Policy in the Sphere of Competition Protection: Goals and Opportunities. Monograph / Ed. V. P. Zavarukhin. – Moscow: IPRAN RAN, 2018. – 80 p., p. 22.

[2] Explanatory note to the draft federal law On Amending Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Article 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation.

[3] Criminal Proceedings / Data on Assigned Punishment under Articles of the CC RF in 2020 / Legal Information Agency.

[4] Bill No. 848246-7 On Amending Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Article 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation.

[5] Court Sentenced Sergey Shatilo to 3.5 Years of Imprisonment for Attempting to Organize a Cartel. Mikhail Mylnikov, Svetlana Golovina // Vademecum Healthcare Industry Business Magazine. July 31, 2019.

[6] Presumption of Guilt: What the New Cartel Fighting Plan Threatens. Vadim Novikov // RBC dated July 3, 2019.

[7] Commentary by Dmitry Medvedev on Decree No. 1314-r dated June 17, 2019, at a Government Meeting on June 27, 2019 // Website of the Government of the Russian Federation.

[8] Maksimov, S. V., Utarov, K. A. Criminal Policy in the Sphere of Competition Protection: Goals and Opportunities. Monograph / Ed. V. P. Zavarukhin. – Moscow: IPRAN RAN, 2018. – 80 p., p. 33.

[9] Order of FAS Russia No. 1073/19 dated August 8, 2019, On Approval of Methodological Recommendations on Organizing Interaction between FAS Russia and Interested Law Enforcement Agencies to Detect, Disclose, and Investigate Crimes Associated with Competition Restriction.

[10] Item 23 of the Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 2 dated March 4, 2021, On Certain Issues Arising in Connection with the Application of Antimonopoly Legislation by Courts.

[11] Clarification of FAS Russia No. 14 dated May 30, 2018, On the Qualification of Agreements between Economic Entities Participating in Tenders (approved by the Protocol of the Presidium of FAS Russia No. 7 dated May 30, 2018).

[12] Cassation Ruling of the Fifth Cassation Court of General Jurisdiction dated September 14, 2021, No. 77-1135/2021.

[13] Sentence of the Oktyabrsky District Court of Novosibirsk No. 1-15/2020 dated July 8, 2020.

[14] Sentence of the Moskovsky District Court of Saint Petersburg No. 1-1041/19 dated December 23, 2019.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Maksimov, S. V., Utarov, K. A. Criminal Policy in the Sphere of Competition Protection: Goals and Opportunities. Monograph / Ed. V. P. Zavarukhin. – Moscow: IPRAN RAN, 2018. – 80 p., p. 36.

[17] Order of FAS Russia No. 1073/19 dated August 8, 2019, On Approval of Methodological Recommendations on Organizing Interaction between FAS Russia and Interested Law Enforcement Agencies to Detect, Disclose, and Investigate Crimes Associated with Competition Restriction.

[18] Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 48 dated November 15, 2016, On the Practice of Application by Courts of Legislation Regulating the Specifics of Criminal Liability for Crimes in the Sphere of Entrepreneurial and Other Economic Activity.

[19] Order of FAS Russia No. 1073/19 dated August 8, 2019, On Approval of Methodological Recommendations on Organizing Interaction between FAS Russia and Interested Law Enforcement Agencies to Detect, Disclose, and Investigate Crimes Associated with Competition Restriction.

[20] Ruling of the Sixth Cassation Court of General Jurisdiction dated February 11, 2021, No. 77-311/2021.

[21] Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 32 dated July 7, 2015, On Judicial Practice in Cases of Money Laundering or Other Property Acquired Criminally, and on the Acquisition or Sale of Property Known to Have Been Obtained Criminally.

[22] Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 29 dated December 27, 2002, On Judicial Practice in Cases of Theft, Larceny, and Robbery.

[23] Order of FAS Russia No. 1073/19 dated August 8, 2019, On Approval of Methodological Recommendations on Organizing Interaction between FAS Russia and Interested Law Enforcement Agencies to Detect, Disclose, and Investigate Crimes Associated with Competition Restriction.

[24] Maksimov, S. V., Utarov, K. A. Criminal Policy in the Sphere of Competition Protection: Goals and Opportunities. Monograph / Ed. V. P. Zavarukhin. – Moscow: IPRAN RAN, 2018. – 80 p., p. 46.

[25] Sentence of the Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Novosibirsk No. 1-296/2019 dated August 28, 2019.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Decision of the Saint Petersburg OFAS Russia dated November 1, 2019, in case No. 1-11-3/78-06-19.

[28] Tenishev, A. P. The Investigation Initiates Cases More Willingly under Article 178 of the CC When There Are Related Elements of Crimes / A. P. Tenishev // Criminal Process – 2020, No. 10. pp. 68-72.